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The Defense Calls ...the Accuser? State v. Brigman and How
the North Carolina Court of Appeals Misconstrued Crawford's
Application to Available Witnesses
On March 8, 2004, the United States Supreme Court addressed
the admissibility of certain hearsay statements in criminal trials in
Crawford v. Washington.' The decision signaled a significant change
in the way courts should approach hearsay 2 challenges under the
Confrontation Clause.' In its wake, Crawford left a sea of uncertainty
as courts in North Carolina and across the country have struggled to
resolve the issues it presented. The North Carolina Court of Appeals
in State v. Brigman4 added to the confusion by failing to apply the
Crawford Confrontation Clause analysis to the hearsay statements of
witnesses who were available to testify at trial.
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution
provides that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy
the right ...to be confronted with the witnesses against him."5 In

Crawford, the Court unanimously found that the introduction of
certain hearsay statements violated the defendant's rights under the
Confrontation Clause.6 In reaching this result, the Court effectively
overruled the previous framework for analyzing admissibility of
1. 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
2. The Federal Rules of Evidence define hearsay as "a statement, other than one
made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove
the truth of the matter asserted." FED. R. EVID. 801(c); see also N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8C-1,

Rule 801(c) (2005) (mirroring the federal definition of hearsay). "Hearsay is not
admissible except as provided by these rules or by other rules prescribed by the Supreme
Court pursuant to statutory authority or by Act of Congress." FED. R. EVID. 802; see also
N.C.GEN. STAT. § 8C-1, Rule 802 (2005) ("Hearsay is not admissible except as provided
by statute or by these rules.").
3. See State v. Lewis, 360 N.C. 1, 14, 619 S.E.2d 830, 839 (2005) ("Crawford
represents a significant departure from the now well-established analytical framework set
out in Ohio v. Roberts."), vacated, 126 S.Ct. 2983 (2006).
4. 171 N.C. App. 305, 615 S.E.2d 21 (2005), discretionary review denied, 360 N.C. 67
(2005).
5. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The North Carolina Constitution has a similar provision.
N.C. CONST.art. I, § 23 ("In all criminal prosecutions, every person charged with [a] crime
has the right ... to confront the accusers and witnesses with other testimony ....
").The
effect of the state and federal clauses is similar: "Thus, it is apparent that we have relied
heavily upon the United States Supreme Court's interpretation of the Confrontation
Clause of the Sixth Amendment in cases in which defendants have also raised
confrontation issues under the Confrontation Clause of the North Carolina Constitution."
State v. Jackson, 348 N.C. 644, 653, 503 S.E.2d 101, 107 (1998).
6. See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68-69.
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The prior framework, created in Ohio v.

Roberts,8 provided that "when a hearsay declarant is not present for
cross-examination at trial, the Confrontation Clause normally
requires a showing that he is unavailable. Even then, his statement is
admissible only if it bears adequate 'indicia of reliability.' "
Justice Scalia, writing for the Crawford majority, found that the
Roberts framework represented a "fundamental failure" to interpret
the Confrontation Clause correctly ° and departed from "historical
principles."'" Justice Scalia found the Roberts test both too broad and
too narrow. The test was too broad by applying to all hearsay and too
narrow by admitting testimonial hearsay on a showing of mere
reliability.12
Seeking to remedy these deficiencies, Justice Scalia exhaustively
examined historical concerns surrounding the Sixth Amendment and
Justice Scalia distinguished
previous confrontation decisions. 3
where nonbetween testimonial and non-testimonial hearsay:
testimonial hearsay was at issue, the Court would defer completely to
the states, 4 but where testimonial hearsay was at issue, the Court
adopted "an absolute bar" to admission. 5 The Court allowed a
narrow exception to this absolute bar where two conditions are met:
a prior opportunity to cross-examine and unavailability. 16 With this
7. Chief Justice Rehnquist joined the Court's result, but filed a concurring opinion
resolving the issue under the Roberts framework and prior case law, which had previously
construed the rights granted under the Confrontation Clause. See id. at 76 (Rehnquist,
C.J., concurring). O'Connor joined in this concurrence. See id. at 69.
8. 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
9. Id. at 66. To meet this test, "evidence must either fall within a 'firmly rooted
hearsay exception' or bear 'particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.' " Crawford, 541
U.S. at 40 (quoting Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66).
10. Crawford,541 U.S. at 67.
11. Id. at 60.
12. See id.
13. See id. at 42-56.
14. See id. at 68 (affording the states flexibility in their development of hearsay law).
Crawford allowed a state to "exempt [non-testimonial hearsay] from Confrontation
Clause scrutiny altogether." Id.; see also Robert P. Mosteller, Crawford v. Washington.
Encouraging and Ensuring the Confrontationof Witnesses, 39 U. RICH. L. REV. 511, 617
(2005) (noting that the Confrontation Clause has "nothing whatsoever to say about nontestimonial hearsay").
15. Crawford,541 U.S. at 61; see also United States v. Franklin, 415 F.3d 537, 545 (6th
Cir. 2005) ("After Crawford, there is 'an absolute bar to statements that are testimonial,
absent a prior opportunity to cross examine.' " (quoting Crawford,541 U.S. at 61)).
16. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 59; see also State v. Lewis, 360 N.C. 1, 14, 619 S.E.2d 830,
839 (2005) ("[T]estimonial evidence is inadmissible against a criminal defendant unless the
declarant is unavailable and the defendant had a prior opportunity to cross-examine the
declarant."), vacated, 126 S. Ct. 2983 (2006); State v. Staten, 610 S.E.2d 823, 836 (S.C. Ct.
App. 2005) (noting the strict limitation Crawford places on testimonial statements by
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new formulation, the Court shifted the focus from the reliability of
the hearsay statement to the nature of the hearsay statement:
admissibility turned on whether the hearsay statement was
testimonial." However, despite the clear future significance of its
meaning, the Court did not formulate a "comprehensive definition of
'testimonial.' "18 Through this new analysis, the Court addressed both
problems with the Roberts framework: by removing any federal
constraint on the use of non-testimonial evidence, the test was no
longer too broad, and by creating an absolute bar to the use of
testimonial hearsay, except in very limited circumstances, the test was
also no longer too narrow. 19
In his concurrence, Chief Justice Rehnquist cautioned that the
Crawford decision would "cast[] a mantle of uncertainty over future

criminal trials in both federal and state courts."20 Certainly, courts in
North Carolina and across the country have struggled to apply the
Crawford analysis, particularly with formulating a workable definition

of "testimonial."'" Despite the ambiguities, the courts have remained
clear that a confrontation challenge to the introduction of a hearsay
statement should begin its inquiry with the issue of whether the

hearsay statements were testimonial in nature. If the statements are
non-testimonial, any Crawford analysis ends;22 however, where the
indicating "[t]he analysis of whether the admission ... violated the Confrontation Clause
begins with the question of whether the statements are testimonial, triggering Crawford's
per se rule against their admission").
17. See Lewis, 360 N.C. at 14, 619 S.E.2d at 839 ("Following Crawford, the
determinative question with respect to confrontation analysis is whether the challenged
hearsay statement is testimonial.").
18. See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68 n.10 (acknowledging that the Court's "refusal to
articulate a comprehensive definition in this case will cause interim uncertainty," but
accepting it as such because "it can hardly be any worse than the status quo").
19. See id. at 68.
20. Id. at 69.
21. Thus, often the primary issue before courts is whether a statement qualifies as
testimonial or not. See, e.g., State v. Allen, 171 N.C. App. 71, 74-78, 614 S.E.2d 361, 36467 (2005) (finding that statements made to a police officer were testimonial); State v.
Forrest, 164 N.C. App. 272, 280, 596 S.E.2d 22, 27 (2004) (concluding that statements
made by a victim at a crime scene were not testimonial), vacated, 126 S.Ct. 2977 (2006);
State v. Pullen, 163 N.C. App. 696, 702, 594 S.E.2d 248, 252 (2004) (finding that statements
of an accomplice during a police interrogation at a police station were testimonial).
22. See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68 ("Where nontestimonial hearsay is at issue, it is
wholly consistent with the Framers' design to afford the States flexibility in their
development of hearsay law-as does Roberts, and as would an approach that exempted
such statements from Confrontation Clause scrutiny altogether."); State v. Blackstock, 165
N.C. App. 50, 62, 598 S.E.2d 412, 420 (2004) (holding that hearsay statements by murder
victim to wife and daughter were non-testimonial, and thus admissible under Crawford),
discretionary review denied, 359 N.C. 283, 610 S.E.2d 208 (2005). For federal court
decisions, see, for example, Sandifer v. Lewis, 120 F. App'x 202, 204 n.1 (9th Cir. 2005)
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statements are testimonial, the Crawford analysis applies, and the
hearsay statements are presumptively barred.23
North Carolina courts have recognized that the inquiry into the
testimonial nature of the hearsay statements is the first step in
Crawford's Confrontation Clause analysis by developing a standard
approach to Crawford issues that begins with determining "whether
the evidence admitted was testimonial in nature. '24 Furthermore, the
Supreme Court of North Carolina has recently observed that,
"[f]ollowing Crawford, the determinative question with respect to
confrontation analysis is whether the challenged hearsay statement is
testimonial. '25 The second step in the analysis bars admission unless
the declarant is unavailable and the defendant had a prior
opportunity to cross-examine the declarant; otherwise the evidence is
inadmissible.26 Despite the straightforward North Carolina standard,
the court of appeals in State v. Brigman failed to apply the Crawford
analysis to available declarants and ignored the testimonial inquiry of
the analysis entirely. By admitting testimonial hearsay of available
declarants solely on a misconstrued reading of the Crawford
requirement of declarant unavailability, Brigman greatly confounds
North Carolina's approach to Crawford issues.
("We, however, need not consider Crawford's application to this case given the nontestimonial nature of the prosecutor's comments."); United States v. Cabral, 138 Fed.
App'x 359, 360 (2d Cir. 2005) ("The introduction of certain hearsay testimony did not
violate the Confrontation Clause, for the hearsay statements ... were decidedly nontestimonial under Crawford .... ). For academic discussion, see, for example, JESSICA
SMITH, CRAWFORD V. WASHINGTON: CONFRONTATION ONE YEAR LATER 7 (2005),
available at http://ncinfo.iog.unc.edu/pubs/electronicversions/pdfs/crawford.pdf ("Because
Crawford applies only to 'testimonial' evidence, the central inquiry in any Crawford
analysis will always focus on whether the evidence at issue is testimonial or nontestimonial."); Ralph Ruebner & Timothy Scahill, Crawford v. Washington, the
ConfrontationClause, and Hearsay: A New Paradigmfor Illinois Evidence Law, 36 LOY.
U. CHI. L.J. 703, 715 (2005) ("If a statement is deemed 'non-testimonial,' the rule of
Crawford cannot be applied to exclude the statement.").
23. See supra notes 15-16 and accompanying text.
24. State v. Clark, 165 N.C. App. 279, 283, 598 S.E.2d 213, 217 (2004). The remaining
two issues to consider are "(2) whether the trial court properly ruled the declarant was
unavailable; and (3) whether defendant had an opportunity to cross-examine the
declarant." Id.; see also State v. Lewis, 166 N.C. App. 596, 600, 603 S.E.2d 559, 561 (2004)
(citing Clark and applying the same analysis), rev'd, 360 N.C. 1, 619 S.E.2d 830 (2005),
vacated, 126 S. Ct. 2983 (2006).
25. State v. Lewis, 360 N.C. 1, 14, 619 S.E.2d 830, 839 (2005), vacated, 126 S. Ct. 2983
(2006); see also State v. Forrest, 164 N.C. App. 272, 284, 596 S.E.2d 22, 29 (2004) (Wynn,
J., dissenting) (" '[Ujnder Crawford....

analysis will usually turn on the question whether

a particular statement is testimonial in nature or not.' " (quoting People v. Moscat, 777
N.Y.S.2d 875, 877 (2004))), affd, 359 N.C. 424, 611 S.E.2d 833 (2005), vacated, 126 S. Ct.
2977 (2006).
26. See Lewis, 360 N.C. at 14,619 S.E.2d at 839.
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This Recent Development focuses on Brigman's discussion of
Crawford's application to available declarants:
Crawford revised the standard for admissibility of hearsay
evidence under the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth
Amendment of the United States Constitution only when the
witness is unavailable. A defendant's right to confront
defendant's accuser is not compromised when the declarant is
available to testify. However, a defendant may waive this right
"by simply failing to exercise it at the trial." In the present
case, [the two available declarants] were "available" to testify,
although neither the State nor defendant called them to testify.
Defendant therefore waived her right to confront [the available
declarants], and defendant's arguments as they relate to the
statements made by [the two available declarants] are
overruled.2 7
The practical effect of the court's language in Brigman is to allow the
prosecution to introduce testimonial evidence through hearsay, even
when the declarant is available. This Recent Development argues
that Brigman misconstrued the Crawford analysis by failing to apply
it to all testimonial hearsay statements, regardless of declarant
availability, and by failing to require the prosecution to either call an
available testimonial declarant or to meet the strict Crawford
standards.
If North Carolina courts and prosecutors follow
Brigman,28 confrontation violations are certain.
This Recent
Development will first address Brigman's decision to withhold
Crawford analysis from available witnesses. Delving further into the
Crawford issues, this Recent Development will then address whether
a declarant's mere availability satisfies confrontation concerns.
Finally, this Recent Development will examine whether the
prosecution should be required to call an available declarant under
the Crawford analysis or risk the declarant's statements being
inadmissible.
The Brigman case involved the sexual abuse of three young
boys. 9 Police initially found the three boys living in squalor while in

27. State v. Brigman, 171 N.C. App. 305, 310, 615 S.E.2d 21, 24 (2005), discretionary
review denied, 360 N.C. 67, 621 S.E.2d 881 (2005).
28. While Brigman is recent, it has already been cited by the State for the proposition
that Crawforddoes not apply to available witnesses. Brief for the State at 8, State v. Hall,
No. COA05-654 (N.C. Ct. App. Aug. 24, 2005), available at http://www.ncappellate

courts.org/spooldocs/1125070413529611432300046/05-654sb.pdf.
29. See Brigman, 171 N.C. App. at 306-08, 615 S.E.2d at 21-23.
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the care of their mother, Kimberly Brigman. ° Rowan County Child
Protective Services placed the boys into foster care where the boys all
told their separate foster parents stories of sexual abuse by both
Brigman and their father.31 At trial, none of the boys were called to
testify;32 instead, their foster parents testified, and the boys'
statements were brought out under exceptions to the hearsay rule.33
On appeal, the defendant argued that the hearsay statements of
the three children were testimonial and inadmissible under the
Crawford analysis.34 While Brigman purports to follow North

Carolina's standard Crawford methodology, which first considers the
testimonial nature of a statement, 35 the court instead decisively
considered the declarant's availability. 36 The court overruled the
defendant's Crawford arguments in relation to the two children found

available to testify because, according to the court, the Crawford
analysis does not apply to available witnesses, and the defendant's
30.
31.
32.
33.

Id. at 306, 615 S.E.2d at 21-22.
Id. at 306-07, 615 S.E.2d at 22.
See id. at 308, 615 S.E.2d at 23.
See id. at 310, 615 S.E.2d at 24. The court explained that

the statements of [the two boys] were admissible hearsay under North Carolina
Rule of Evidence 803(24), which provides that hearsay evidence may be admitted,
"even though the declarant is available as a witness[,]" if it has "circumstantial
guarantees of trustworthiness," and if the court determines that (A) the statement
is offered as evidence of a material fact; (B) the statement is more probative on
the point for which it is offered than any other evidence which the proponent can
procure through reasonable efforts; and (C) the general purposes of these rules
and the interests of justice will best be served by admission of the statement into
evidence.
Id. (quoting N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8C-1, Rule 803(24) (2004)).
34. Id. at 308-09, 615 S.E.2d at 23.
35. See id. at 309, 615 S.E.2d at 23 (reciting the Clark test).
36. See id. at 310, 615 S.E.2d at 24. The court addressed "the first question" by
referring to "whether the evidence admitted was testimonial in nature," yet it proceeded
to consider the availability of two of the witnesses instead. Id. at 309-10, 615 S.E.2d at 2324. Furthermore, the State appears to have failed to anticipate the Brigman court's
reading of Crawford, as evidenced by its brief, which contemplated the more standard
North Carolina approach and did not address the witnesses' availability at all. See Brief
for the State at 8-12, State v. Brigman, 171 N.C. App. 305, 615 S.E.2d 21 (2005) (No.
COA04-563), available at http://www.ncappellatecourts.org/spoo/docs/1095362221769428
857908681/04-563sb.pdf. The State's brief argues, "Since the statements here were not
testimonial, the issue of Defendant's opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses is
irrelevant." Id. at 12. The State's brief finishes by responding only to the issue of prioropportunity to cross-examine:
"Even if it were relevant, however, Defendant has
proffered no cogent reason why she was not able to confront the children with their prior
allegations when they took the stand during the voir dire hearing." Id. Instead, the State
discussed the testimonial nature of the statements and the sufficiency of prior-cross
examination. Id.
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confrontation rights were not violated when the witnesses were
available.37
Furthermore, after a thorough analysis, the court

determined that the unavailable child's statements were nontestimonial and, as such, were admissible under Crawford.38 Finding
no Confrontation Clause violations, the court then affirmed the
defendant's conviction.3 9 This methodology left the nature of the
statements of the two available boys completely ignored.40 Had the
court followed the correct approach, it is entirely possible that the
statements would have been found testimonial and in violation of the
defendant's rights under the Confrontation Clause.4 1 The Brigman
court explained its failure to apply the Crawford analysis to the

available declarants by reasoning that "Crawford revised the standard
for admissibility of hearsay evidence under the Confrontation Clause

of the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution only when
the witness is unavailable."42 Brigman cited ten pages of the Supreme

Court's opinion as authority for this claim.43 The ten-page citation is
entirely unrelated to the court of appeals' argument, as the cited
37. Brigman, 171 N.C. App. at 310, 615 S.E.2d at 24 ("Crawford revised the standard
for admissibility of hearsay evidence under the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth
Amendment of the United States Constitution only when the witness is unavailable. A
defendant's right to confront defendant's accuser is not compromised when the declarant
is available to testify." (citing Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 60-69 (2004))).
38. Id. at 310, 615 S.E.2d at 24.
39. Id. at 313, 615 S.E.2d at 26.
40. The court states in a footnote, "Though we only address defendant's arguments as
they pertain to [the unavailable witness], we note that the analysis and resulting
conclusions regarding the statements made by [the available witnesses] would be the
same." Id. at 311 n.1, 615 S.E.2d at 24 n.1. This statement stands in stark contrast to the
express language of the opinion, which completely foreclosed analysis of the available
children's statements. See id. at 310, 615 S.E.2d at 24 ("First, we note that defendant's
[confrontation challenges] only pertain to statements made by J.B. because he was the
only witness determined to be unavailable by the trial court."). Regardless, this Recent
Development proceeds by taking the court at its word: that the defendant's arguments
with regard to the two available children were overruled because of their availability.
41. While the statements of all three children were likely made in the same manner, it
is certainly possible for a court to find one declarant's statements testimonial, while
finding another similar declarant's statements non-testimonial. Crawford inquiries "will
usually turn on the question of whether a particular statement is testimonial or nontestimonial in nature" and should be taken on a case-by-case basis. State v. Blackstock,
165 N.C. App. 50, 62, 598 S.E.2d 412, 420 (2004) (emphasis added), discretionary review
denied, 359 N.C. 283, 610 S.E.2d 208 (2005). The court's analysis of the testimonial nature
of the unavailable child's statements was fact-specific and related to that child's particular
experiences and impressions when making the statements. See Brigman, 171 N.C. App. at
310-13, 615 S.E.2d at 25-26. The court should have analyzed both available children's
statements in the same fact-specific manner as the unavailable child.
42. Brigman, 171 N.C. App. at 310,615 S.E.2d at 24.
43. See id. at 310, 615 S.E.2d at 24 (citing Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 60-69
(2004)).
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section is exclusively concerned with the issue of a prior opportunity
for cross-examination and repeatedly fails to make any mention of
availability.' However, nothing in the section cited, or any other part
of the Crawford opinion,45 precludes application to available
witnesses. Quite to the contrary, by requiring that a declarant be
unavailable before testimonial hearsay can be admitted, Crawford

expressly mandates that availability is an integral part of the analysis.
Further, jurisdictions across the country have applied the
Crawford analysis to available witnesses. A federal district court in
Pennsylvania applied Crawford to statements made by a witness who
had recently become available and held that the statements could not
"be admitted into evidence ...because the requirement of the

Confrontation Clause that the declarant be unavailable [was] not
met. ' 46 The Ninth Circuit,47 the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals,"
and the Mississippi Court of Appeals49 all echoed this approach and

44. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 60-69 (2004) (discussing the problems
under the Roberts framework as they relate to a prior opportunity to cross-examine). The
concept of availability appears only once in the oft-quoted holding:
"the Sixth
Amendment demands what the common law required: unavailability and a prior
opportunity for cross-examination." Id. at 68. Ironically, this particular quotation may
completely contradict the North Carolina Court of Appeals' finding that Crawford applies
only to unavailable witnesses. See infra notes 63-66 and accompanying text (discussing
whether mere availability satisfies the Crawford analysis or actually causes one of its
requirements to fail).
45. See infra notes 74-77 and accompanying text (discussing the specific facts of
Crawford involving a witness who was "available," but was not called based on spousal
immunity).
46. United States v. Lafferty, 372 F. Supp. 2d 446, 461 (W.D. Pa. 2005),
reconsiderationgranted in part,387 F. Supp. 2d 500 (W.D. Pa. 2005).
47. See Bockting v. Bayer, No. 02-15866, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 9973, at *31 (9th Cir.
June 1, 2005). In Bockting, a case factually similar to Brigman, the trial court admitted
hearsay testimonial statements of a child-accuser found unavailable based on the child's
refusal to cooperate at the preliminary hearing. Id. at *6. The Ninth Circuit found that
the trial court violated Crawford due to the defendant's inability to cross-examine the
child. Id. at *31. The court noted that Crawford requires "not only cross-examination but
unavailability" and held that the preliminary hearing and subsequent findings were
"truncated and conclusory at best," and thus, the determination of unavailability was
"troubling." Id. The court refrained from ruling on this issue because the lack of crossexamination had already resulted in reversible error, but the language indicates that had
the child been found available, Crawfordwould have excluded the evidence. Id.
48. See Bratton v. State, 156 S.W.3d 689, 693-94 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (applying
Crawford to two nontestifying, available declarants and holding that the two declarants
"were available to testify, and nothing in the record suggests ... that [the defendant] was
afforded a prior opportunity to cross-examine them. As such, the statements were
inadmissible ....).
49. See Elkins v. State, 918 So. 2d 828, 832 (Miss. Ct. App. 2005) (citing Crawford,541
U.S. at 53-54, 68) (noting that "[u]nder Crawford, the confrontation clause is violated
when a hearsay declarant is available to testify at the trial, but does not do so").
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applied the Crawford analysis to available declarants to find
Confrontation Clause violations. Even courts that eventually found
no Confrontation Clause error still applied the Crawford analysis to
available witnesses. 0 Finally, Judge Wynn of the North Carolina
Court of Appeals recognized that the Crawford analysis applies to
available witnesses and created an approach that correctly applies the
Crawford decision:
If the statement is testimonial, it must then be determined
whether the declarant was unavailable and if there was a prior
If the declarant was
opportunity for cross-examination.
available or if there was not a prior opportunity for crossexamination, then Defendant's Sixth Amendment right to
confront the witnesses againsthim was violated. However, if the
statement is characterized as nontestimonial, then the rules of
evidence, including hearsay rules, apply.5 '
Thus, these courts have correctly concluded that the Crawford
However, Brigman
analysis applies to available declarants.
incorrectly foreclosed the application of Crawford to available
declarants, and North Carolina will violate the constitutional rights of
defendants if it continues to interpret Crawford erroneously. Courts
should instead continue to focus first on the nature of the statement,

even in situations where the declarant is available. Nothing in the
Crawford decision or in North Carolina's existing approach precludes
the application of Crawford's Confrontation Clause analysis to
declarants who are available to testify at trial.

Judge Wynn's

50. These jurisdictions found the available declarant's statements to be nontestimonial. See, e.g., Smith v. State, 898 So. 2d 907, 916 (Ala. Crim. App. 2004) (finding
that Crawford "does not appear to be implicated here because the evidence at issue is not
testimonial"). One case does stand as an anomaly. The Georgia Court of Appeals applied
Crawford to a witness who was, according to the prosecutor, "in the courthouse and
'available if necessary,' " but found no Confrontation Clause violation. See Starr v. State,
604 S.E.2d 297, 299 (Ga. Ct. App. 2004). The Georgia court assumed that the statements
were testimonial, thus delving into the standard Crawford analysis, but ultimately found
no Crawford violation because of its erroneous reading of Crawford. Id. For a discussion
of this case and its rationale, see infra notes 56-60. Regardless of the outcome, the
Georgia court still considered the defendant's argument under Crawford, which the
Brigman court failed to do. See Starr, 604 S.E.2d at 299.
51. State v. Gonzales, No. COAO3-653, 2004 N.C. App. LEXIS 503, at *12 (N.C. Ct.
App. Apr. 6, 2004) (Wynn, J., concurring) (emphasis added), appeal denied and
discretionary review denied, 358 N.C. 547, 599 S.E.2d 566 (2004), cert. denied, 543 U.S.
1070 (2005). Strangely, by concurring in Brigman, Judge Wynn appears to have reversed
course and abandoned his previous recommended approach to Crawford issues. See State
v. Brigman, 171 N.C. App. 305,313, 615 S.E.2d 21, 26 (2005), discretionary review denied,
360 N.C. 67,621 S.E.2d 881 (2005).
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methodology, quoted above, offers the most straightforward
approach and should be followed to avoid any future confusion.
Brigman's language wrongly grants additional importance to the
declarant's availability. The court incorrectly holds that the second
requirement for the testimonial hearsay exception, a prior
opportunity to cross-examine, is satisfied by the declarant's mere
availability to testify. 2 While Crawford and reviewing courts have
been clear that confrontation concerns are obviated when the
declarant testifies and is cross-examined at trial,53 Brigman takes one
giant leap forward and holds that direct testimony and cross-

examination are not required.

According to Brigman, mere

availability is enough:54 "A defendant's right to confront defendant's

accuser is not compromised when the declarant is available to
testify."55
While Brigman remarkably offered no authority for this
statement, the Georgia Court of Appeals found specific language in
Crawford that purportedly showed that mere availability is sufficient.
In Starr v. State,56 the available declarant did not testify, and the court
held that his mere availability satisfied the Crawford analysis.5 ' As
authority, Starr quoted a footnote from Crawford that

52. Brigman, 171 N.C. App. at 310,615 S.E.2d at 24.
53. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 59 n.9 (2004) ("[W]hen the declarant
appears for cross-examination at trial, the Confrontation Clause places no constraints at
all on the use of his prior testimonial statements."); see also State v. Thach, 106 P.3d 782,
789 (Wash. Ct. App. 2005) ("Crawford has no bearing on this case as the Supreme Court
stated that the confrontation clause is not implicated when the declarant is available for
cross-examination at trial. Ms. Thach appeared at trial and Binh was able to crossexamine her about her statements." (citations omitted)); Crawford v. State, 139 S.W.3d
462, 465 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004) ("The sole authority on which appellant relies simply
does not apply when the declarant was available to, and did, testify at trial and was subject
to cross-examination. The Clause does not bar admission of a statement so long as the
declarant is present at trial to defend or explain it.").
54. See Brigman, 171 N.C. App. at 310, 615 S.E.2d at 24 ("A defendant's right to
confront defendant's accuser is not compromised when the declarant is available to
testify."). The United States Supreme Court has never directly spoken on the issue of
whether mere availability is enough to survive a confrontation challenge. See Mosteller,
supra note 14, at 578 (noting that the Court "has never decided whether prior statements
of a witness can be admitted under the Confrontation Clause as a result of confrontation
at the current trial, or whether the witness simply being available to be called and crossexamined by the defendant is sufficient").
55. Brigman, 171 N.C. App. at 310,615 S.E.2d at 24.
56. 604 S.E.2d 297 (Ga. Ct. App. 2004).
57. Id. at 299 ("Although the victim did not testify, the record shows that she was
available for cross-examination.... We therefore find no error with respect to this
contention."). The Starr court addressed the Crawford issue cursorily, after having
already reversed the trial court on other grounds. See id.
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explicitly stated ... that if a "declarant appears for crossexamination at trial, the Confrontation Clause places no
constraints at all on the use of his prior testimonial statements
....The Clause does not bar admission of a statement so long
as the declarant is present at trial to defend or explain it."58
Thus, the Starr court equated " 'appear[ing] for cross-examination at
trial' " or being " 'present at trial to defend or explain' " with mere
availability. 59 However, the context of the quote from Crawford is

one in which the declarant actually testifies, and this passage does not
stand for the proposition that mere availability is sufficient.6 °

Additionally, these phrases, "appear[ing]" and being "present at
trial," have been used in countless North Carolina cases, consistently

referring to a witness who actually testified. 61 Thus, Crawford and its
58. Id. (quoting Crawford, 541 U.S. at 59 n.9).
59. See id. Scattered other authorities have read this language similarly. See, e.g.,
Sherrie Bourg Carter & Bruce M. Lyons, The PotentialImpact of Crawford v. Washington
on Child Abuse, Elderly Abuse and Domestic Violence Litigation, THE CHAMPION, Sept.Oct. 2004, at 24 ("At first glance, it may appear that Crawford would not affect [available
declarants] given that the decision specifically states that ... 'when the declarant appears
for cross-examination at trial, the Confrontation Clause places no constraints at all on the
use of his prior testimonial statements.' ").
60. The ellipsis in Starr's quotation from Crawford masked an integral sentence that
set the context of the paragraph as one in which the declarant actually testifies and is not
merely available. The sentence notes that "[ilt is therefore irrelevant that the reliability of
some out-of-court statements 'cannot be replicated, even if the declarant testifies to the
same matters in court.' " Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 59 n.9 (2004) (citations
omitted) (emphasis added). This omitted sentence quoted from Chief Justice Rehnquist's
concurrence in which he voiced concern that Crawford might preclude the use of certain
out-of-court statements that were reliable. See id. The Crawford majority was simply
responding that if the declarant actually testifies, there is no limit to the use of his prior
statements. See id. at 59. Courts have generally cited the section of Crawford pointed to
by Starr when a defendant makes a confrontation challenge after a declarant who actually
testifies is unresponsive on cross-examination. See, e.g., State v. Harrell, No. COA051227, 2006 N.C. App. LEXIS 1066, at *9-10 (N.C. Ct. App. May 16, 2006) (citing
Crawford to conclude that where a declarant actually testifies and is subject to "full and
effective cross-examination," there are no limits on use of his prior statements); State v.
Painter, No. COA04-896, 2005 N.C. App. LEXIS 2000, at *14 (N.C. Ct. App. Sept. 20,
2005) (citing Crawford to conclude that lack of responsiveness on the part of a declarant
who actually testifies and is cross-examined is an insufficient ground on which to base a
confrontation challenge).
61. See Harrell,2006 N.C. App. LEXIS 1066, at *9-10 (using the phrase "appear[s] for
cross-examination" to refer to a witness who actually testified and was cross-examined);
Painter, 2005 N.C. App. LEXIS 2000, at *14 (using the phrase "appears for crossexamination" to refer to a witness who actually testified and was cross examined); State v.
Lewis, 172 N.C. App. 97, 103, 616 S.E.2d 1, 5 (2005) (quoting the phrase "present at trial"
immediately after the court noted that because "both [witnesses] testified at trial and were
subject to cross-examination, there was no violation of defendant's right to
confrontation"). Even cases which distinguish "appear" from "testify" refer to situations
in which the witness is physically present in the courtroom. See, e.g., Nat'l Labor
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progeny provide no authority that mere availability of the declarant is
sufficient.
In fact, Crawford holds that mere availability is insufficient to
pass constitutional muster: where testimonial evidence is at issue,
cross-examination is the rule.62
Thus, testimonial hearsay is
admissible only where the two conditions set forth in Crawford have
been met.63 The Court views these requirements as sufficient to meet
the concerns of the Sixth Amendment.' Thus, mere availability, far
from satisfying the Crawford analysis, actually causes one of
Crawford's two requirements to fail. To put it another way, the
essential holding of Crawford is that "a nontestifying witness's out-ofcourt testimonial statement ... may be admitted against an accused
only if the witness is unavailable and the accused had an opportunity
to cross-examine the witness."'65 Moreover, Crawford makes clear
that the Confrontation Clause "is a procedural rather than a
substantive guarantee. It commands, not that evidence be reliable,
but that reliability be assessed in a particular manner: by testing in
the crucible of cross-examination."66 Thus, a declarant must take the
stand, testify on direct, and face cross-examination to address the
concerns of the Sixth Amendment and satisfy the Crawfordanalysis.
Yet Brigman argues further that "a defendant may waive this
[confrontation] right 'by simply failing to exercise it at the trial.' "67
Thus, the court reasoned, the defendant who fails to call an available
declarant waives his Sixth Amendment right to confront the witness
providing evidence against him.68 The lone authority Brigman offers
to support this conclusion is State v. Splawn.69 In Splawn, the
defendant challenged a stipulated agreement between defense
counsel and the State to read into evidence the testimony and crossexamination of an SBI chemist who could not attend the trial.7" The
Relations Bd. v. Scrivener, 405 U.S. 117, 125 (1972) (referring to "an employee ...who
appeared but did not testify" in reference to a National Labor Relations Board hearing).
62. See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 61 ("[The Confrontation Clause] commands ...that
reliability be assessed in a particular manner: by testing in the crucible of crossexamination.").
63. See Crawford,541 U.S. at 68.
64. See id.
65. People v. Couillard, 131 P.3d. 1146, 1151 (Colo. Ct. App. 2005).
66. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 61.
67. State v. Brigman, 171 N.C. App. 305, 310, 615 S.E.2d 21, 24 (2005) (quoting State
v. Splawn, 23 N.C. App. 14, 18, 208 S.E.2d 242, 245 (1974)), discretionaryreview denied,
360 N.C. 67, 621 S.E.2d 881 (2005).
68. See id.
69. 23 N.C. App. 14, 18, 208 S.E.2d 242,245 (1974).
70. Id. at 17, 208 S.E.2d at 245.
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court found that "the right to cross-examination itself may be waived
by an accused's counsel by simply failing to exercise it at the trial."'"

A number of significant factors seriously undermine the application
of Splawn to the facts in Brigman. In Splawn, the defendant's counsel
fully cross-examined

the witness

one

day before

trial,72 the

defendant's counsel affirmatively consented to the reading of the
testimony into evidence,73 and the declarant's statements were not
likely testimonial. None of these factors were present in Brigman.
Additionally, neither Crawford nor Roberts had been decided in 1974
when Splawn was decided. Thus, the decision would seem hardly
applicable as authority for interpreting the mandates of Crawford,

and Splawn is particularly unpersuasive authority.
Even the specific facts of Crawford seem to foreclose Brigman's

idea that the defendant can waive his confrontation right by failing to
call an available testimonial declarant. Crawford's wife was only
"unavailable" by virtue of "the state marital privilege, which
generally bars a spouse from testifying without the other spouse's
consent."" Thus, the defendant could have waived this privilege and
consented to the wife's testimony. The Washington Supreme Court
specifically rejected a claim by the State that, by failing to give

consent, the defendant had waived his Sixth Amendment rights: "this
court traditionally has 'not required a defendant to waive one right to
preserve another.' "I' The Supreme Court did not express any

opinion on the issue, as the State did not object to that aspect of the
Washington Supreme Court's holding;76 however, by finding a
violation and barring the statements, the Court clearly did not require
the defendant to either call his wife as a witness or waive his
71. Id. at 18,208 S.E.2d at 245.
72. Id. at 17,208 S.E.2d at 245.
73. Id. ("The stipulation by which defendant's counsel agreed to this procedure was
made in open court and entered into the record prior to call of the cases, and at the trial
no objection to this procedure was interposed on behalf of the defendant.").
74. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 40 (2004) (citing WASH. REV. CODE
§ 5.60.060(1) (1994)) (emphasis added). The privilege does not extend to out-of-court
statements, and the prosecution relied on this exception to introduce certain statements
that the defendant's wife made to police. See id.
75. State v. Crawford, 54 P.3d 656, 660 (Wash. 2002) (quoting State v. Crawford, No.
25307-1-II, 2001 Wash. App. LEXIS 1723, at *4 (Wash. Ct. App. July 30, 2001)), rev'd, 541
U.S. 36 (2004); see also id. at 659 ("Although [defendant], not [the declarant], invoked the
privilege, the result is the same-[the declarant] was unavailable to testify.").
76. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 42 n.1 ("[The Washington Supreme Court] rejected the
State's argument that guarantees of trustworthiness were unnecessary since petitioner
waived his Confrontation Rights by invoking the marital privilege. It reasoned that
'forcing the defendant to choose between the marital privilege and confronting his spouse
presents an untenable Hobson's choice.' "(quoting Crawford, 54 P.3d at 660)).
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confrontation rights.77 It follows that North Carolina should not
similarly force the defendant to either call his accuser as his own
witness or waive his confrontation rights.
While Brigman did not cite them, the rules of evidence provide
perhaps the most persuasive authority for the position that the
Crawford analysis need not apply to available declarants. Both the
Federal Rules of Evidence and the North Carolina Rules of Evidence
permit a party against whom hearsay evidence is introduced to call
the declarant as a hostile witness.78 By providing the opposing party
an opportunity to call the declarant as a hostile witness, the drafters
of these rules anticipate that a party might introduce hearsay
statements of an available declarant. However, these evidentiary
rules apply to all hearsay statements, and Crawford set out a clear
distinction between testimonial hearsay, which is barred, and nontestimonial hearsay.79 Additionally, the rules of evidence regarding
testimonial hearsay are superseded by rights granted under the
Confrontation Clause.8' Under Crawford, a defendant should not be
forced to call an available testimonial declarant as a hostile witness or
be faced with waiving her confrontation rights.8 1 In State v. Cox,82 a
Louisiana court found such a rule improper.8 3 In Cox, the state
argued that the defendant waived his confrontation right by failing to
subpoena the declarant.8 4 The court stated that this argument
"beg[ged] the issue" and that the "[d]efendant should not be required
to call [the declarant] as a witness simply to facilitate the State's
introduction of evidence against the [d]efendant."85
77. See id. at 68-69.
78. See FED. R. EvID. 806 ("If the party against whom a hearsay statement has been
admitted calls the declarant as a witness, the party is entitled to examine the declarant on
the statement as if under cross-examination."); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8C-1, Rule 806 (2005)
(same).
79. Crawford,541 U.S. at 68.
80. Crawford is "a reminder that even firmly established exceptions to the hearsay
rule must bow to the right of confrontation." State v. Branch, 865 A.2d 673, 691 (N.J.
2005). Even the State's brief in Brigman acknowledged that Crawford made clear that
"the Confrontation Clause could not be subjugated to the Rules of Evidence." See Brief
for the State, supra note 36, at 9-10.
81. See supra notes 74-77 and accompanying text.
82. 876 So. 2d 932 (La. Ct. App. 2004).
83. Id. at 938-39. The court of appeals decision, which was decided a few months
after Crawford,vacated the defendant's sentence and remanded the case to the trial court
for a new trial due to confrontation violations. See id. at 940.
84. Id. at 938.
85. Id. An argument could be made that the defendant should call an available
declarant, yet North Carolina has placed the burden of producing live testimony on the
prosecution. See infra notes 92-97 and accompanying text (discussing North Carolina
rule); see also Mosteller, supra note 14, at 583-86 (arguing for direct testimony of a witness
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Arguably, Crawford actually requires the prosecution to call an
available declarant upon whose testimony it intends to rely. In stark
contrast, the practical effect of Brigman is to allow the prosecution to
introduce testimonial evidence through hearsay when the declarant is

available. This is contrary to the holding in Crawford,which requires
that the prosecution must either call the available declarant to have
the statements tested in open court, both on direct and on cross, or

show that the two narrow conditions have been met.86 Courts across
the country have echoed this reading.87 The Texas Court of Criminal
Appeals, considering a defendant's confrontation claims88 where the
declarants were available to testify, 89 noted that the prosecution "as
the party seeking to admit [the nontestifying witnesses'] statements"
had the burden "to show their statements were admissible, that [the
nontestifying witnesses] were unavailable and that [defendant] had
been afforded a prior opportunity to cross-examine them."9 0 The
Maryland Court of Appeals, in a case factually similar to Brigman,
called by the prosecution followcd by cross-examination and citing historical practices as
evidence).
86. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 61, 68 (2004).
87. State v. Cox held similarly: "Simply stated, if the State needed to have [the
declarant's] testimony to enable the State to introduce the statement into evidence, the
State could have called [the declarant] as a witness." Cox, 876 So. 2d at 939. An Indiana
case, after finding the confrontation violation harmless, took time to caution the
prosecution: "the State would be well-advised to avoid the tactic of introducing hearsay
statements without calling the declarant to testify in cases where the declarant is in fact
available to testify." Beach v. State, 816 N.E.2d 57, 60 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004); see also
Appleton v. State, 740 N.E.2d 122, 124 (Ind. 2001) ("Trials should principally proceed on
the basis of testimony given in court, not statements or affidavits obtained before trial.").
A federal district court in Pennsylvania evaluated a defendant's Crawford claim against
statements by a declarant made recently available and held that "if the Government
wishes to have [the available declarant's] testimony admitted into evidence [the available
declarant] will have to be called as a witness and testify at the trial in person." United
States v. Lafferty, 372 F. Supp. 2d 446, 461 (W.D. Pa. 2005), reconsiderationgranted in
part,387 F. Supp. 2d 500 (W.D. Pa. 2005).
88. The dispute concerned certain statements by two of defendant's non-testifying
accomplices in a robbery. Bratton v. State, 156 S.W.3d 689, 693-94 (Tex. Crim. App.
2005). The State did not dispute that the accomplice's statements were testimonial. See
id. at 693.
89. See id. at 693-94 (noting that the accomplices were "available, present, and could
have been confronted," and also noting that as the two had already pleaded guilty in the
case, they were not entitled to Fifth Amendment protection, which might otherwise render
them unavailable). The court found a Crawford violation, but did not overturn the
conviction, finding the error harmless. See id. at 695 ("Given the record before us, we
conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the admission of [the co-conspirators']
statements did not contribute to [the defendant's] convictions.").
90. Id. at 694. Furthermore, the court held that "nothing in Crawford or elsewhere
suggest[s] that a defendant waives his right to confront a witness whose testimonial
statement was admitted into evidence by failing to call him as a witness at trial." Id.
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held that "[i]n a criminal trial, the State is required to place the
defendant's accusers on the stand so that the defendant both may
hear the accusations against him or her stated in open court and have
the opportunity to cross-examine those witnesses." 91
Beyond the lack of support Crawford provides for the Brigman
court's position, North Carolina has recognized a preference for live
testimony that should require a prosecutor to introduce testimonial
evidence through live testimony if the declarant is available. 2 Even
before Crawford, North Carolina held that "the live testimony of the
hearsay declarant will ordinarily be more probative than his prior
statement" unless the State's diligent, good-faith efforts fail to
produce the witness. 93 A post-Crawford case continued with this
standard, noting that the State is required to "undertake good-faith
efforts to secure the 'better evidence' of live testimony before
resorting to the 'weaker substitute' of former testimony."94 Crawford
should have only strengthened any requirement when testimonial
evidence is at issue.95
The prosecution is not required to produce a witness simply to
ensure that the witness is available to testify. North Carolina has
recognized a preference for live testimony, not just the opportunity
for live testimony, partially based on a desire to allow the jury to
91. State v. Snowden, 867 A.2d 314, 332-33 (Md. 2005) (finding the statements of a
four-year-old child, brought out by a social worker at trial, were testimonial and wrongly
admitted under Crawford).
92. See, e.g., State v. Nobles, 357 N.C. 433, 437, 584 S.E.2d 765, 769 (2003) (The North
Carolina Supreme Court has "recognized the constitutional 'preference for live
testimony.' " (quoting State v. Jackson, 348 N.C. 644, 654, 503 S.E.2d 101, 107 (1998));
State v. Smith, 315 N.C. 76, 95, 337 S.E.2d 833, 846 (1985) ("Usually, but not always, the
live testimony of the declarant will be the more (if not the most) probative evidence on the
point for which it is offered.").
93. State v. Fowler, 353 N.C. 599, 614, 548 S.E.2d 684, 695 (2001); see also Barber v.
Page, 390 U.S. 719, 724-25 (1968) (noting that "a witness is not 'unavailable' for purposes
of the foregoing exception to the confrontation requirement unless the prosecutorial
authorities have made a good-faith effort to obtain his presence at trial").
94. State v. Bell, 359 N.C. 1, 35,603 S.E.2d 93, 116 (2004) (quoting Nobles, 357 N.C. at
441, 584 S.E.2d at 771), cert. denied, 544 U.S. 1052 (2005).
95. North Carolina courts may have already found that Crawfordfurther strengthens
the requirement that the prosecution call the witness. Prior to Crawford, North Carolina
found the State's burden of diligence and good faith met where it was "practically
impossible to return [the declarant] to this country to testify." See Fowler, 353 N.C. at 614,
548 S.E.2d at 695. Yet, a post-Crawford case found the State failed to meet its burden in a
very similar fact pattern, when it asserted that "[t]he [declarant] was a Hispanic and left,
we tracked, pulled the record, hes [sic] left the state and possibly the country." Bell, 359
N.C. at 34, 603 S.E.2d at 115; see also State v. Jackson, 69 P.3d 722, 725 (Or. Ct. App.
2003) (noting, prior to Crawford, that if a hearsay declarant was available, allowing
prosecution to introduce hearsay statements without calling the declarant would violate
defendant's confrontation rights).
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observe the witness's demeanor. 96 The live testimony of a witness

allows for "exploration of weaknesses in the witness's perception,
memory, and narration of the matters asserted within the
statements." 97 Further, while Crawford does not explicitly say that

actual cross-examination is necessary, it also does not indicate that
mere availability for cross-examination would ever suffice. Robert P.

Mosteller has considered this issue and convincingly argued that the
Court "did not say that the declarant merely had to be available for
cross-examination[,] ... which would have squarely put the

responsibility for ensuring both testimony and cross-examination on
the defense."98 Instead, Mosteller argued that "the Court described
the common law tradition, which provided the Framers with the
concept of confrontation, as one of " 'live testimony in court subject
to adversarial testing,' " which would not be satisfied unless evidence
is brought out on direct and cross-examined by the opposing party. 99

North Carolina's recognition that the prosecution must make
good-faith efforts to secure the better evidence of live testimony, in
addition to the benefits a jury receives from live testimony, must
compel the State to call an available declarant upon whose testimony
they intend to rely, particularly when the statements are testimonial.
The State of North Carolina has already begun citing Brigman
for the proposition that Crawford does not apply to available
declarants. 1 ° Brigman's effect on North Carolina courts will be to
96. See Smith, 315 N.C. at 95 n.8, 337 S.E.2d at 846 n.8 (quoting United States v.
Mathis, 559 F.2d 294, 298 (5th Cir. 1977)).
97. Id.
98. See Mosteller, supra note 14, at 579-80 ("Is it a requirement of the Confrontation
Clause, or perhaps some combination of provisions in the Sixth Amendment, that the
witness in such situations be called by the prosecution and testify in some fashion on direct
examination? The answer must be yes."). Mosteller cites a historical analysis of the
Confrontation Clause, other decisions of the Supreme Court, and even specific examples
from Crawford to conclude that under the Sixth Amendment the burden to call an
available declarant is the prosecution's. Id. at 578-85 (2005). Honorable Paul W. Grimm
and Professor Jerome E. Deise disagreed with Professor Mosteller. See Paul W. Grimm &
Jerome E. Deise, Jr., Hearsay, Confrontation,and Forfeiture by Wrongdoing: Crawford v.
Washington, a Reassessment of the Confrontation Clause, 35 U. BALT. L.F. 5, 22 n.69
(2004) (concluding that "if the defendant fails to ask for a witness he knows is available to
take the stand, he may be found to have had an adequate opportunity for crossexamination"). However, the two cases Grimm and Deise cited in support were both preCrawford,while the one case that finds a confrontation violation is post-Crawford. See id.
(citing In re Personal Restraint of Suave, 692 P.2d 818 (Wash. 1985); State v. Salazar, 796
P.2d 773 (Wash. 1990); State v. Cox, 876 So. 2d 932 (La. Ct. App. 2004)).
99. Mosteller, supra note 14, at 578-79 (quoting Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36,
43 (2004)).
100. See, e.g., Brief for the State, supra note 28, at 8 ("Crawford... requires that where
out-of-court testimonial evidence is involved, a determination must first be made by the
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both discourage live testimony and violate the defendant's
confrontation rights. Certainly, Kimberly Brigman is not a very
sympathetic defendant. Indeed, many of the situations in which an
available testimonial declarant will not be called are situations in
which the witnesses are victims of child abuse. But the Confrontation
Clause requires that the prosecution either call an available declarant,
or show unavailability and a prior-opportunity to cross-examine.
Anything short of this violates the defendant's rights under the Sixth
Amendment.
JEREMY

M. FALCONE*

trial court whether the proffered hearsay evidence was testimonial in nature. If so, then,
whether the declarant was unavailable at trial, and, if not, whether defendant had a prior
opportunity to cross-examine the declarant." (citing Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36,
68 (2004); State v. Brigman, 171 N.C. App. 305, 310, 615 S.E.2d 21, 24 (2005))).
* The author would like to thank Professor Ken Broun for his help with this Recent
Development.

